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1989 I POLICY and PROCEDURES I 

OSHA INSTRUCTION CPL 2-2.44A (Iowa) 
SUBJECT: Enforcement Procedures for Occupational Exposure to Hepatitis B Virus 
(HBV) and Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). 
A. PURPOSE. This instruction provides uniform inspection procedures and 
guidelines to be followed when conducting inspections and issuing citations 
under Iowa Code section 88. 4 and pertinent standards for health care 
workers and public sector workers potentially exposed to HBV and HIV. 
B. DEFINITIONS. 
1. Health Care Facility. Those establishments listed under the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 8Q'l'd,. and 7261; and clinics, 
health units, and nurses' stations at industrial work sites. 
2. Health Care Worker. An employee of a health care facility, including, 
but not limited to, nurses, physicians, dentists and other dental 
workers, optometrists, podiatrists, chiropractors, laboratory and 
blood bank technologists and technicians, research laboratory 
scientists, phlebotomists, dialysis personnel, paramedics, emergency 
medical technicians, medical examiners, morticians, housekeepers, 
laundry workers and others whose work may involve direct contact with 
body fluids, as defined below, from living individuals or corpses. 
3. Public Sector Worker. An employee of state, county or local 
government, including, but not limited to, police, fire, ambulance and 
other emergency response workers. 
4. Universal Precautions. The term "universal precautions" refers to a 
system of infectious disease control which assumes that every direct 
contact with body fluids is infectious and requires every employee 
exposed to direct contact with body fluids to be protected as though 
such body fluids were HBV or HIV infecte.d. Therefore, universal 
precautions are intended to prevent health care workers from 
parenteral, mucous membrane, and non-intact skin exposures to 
blood-borne pathogens. 
5. Body Fluids. Fluids that have been recognized by CDC as directly 
linked to the transmission of HIV and/or HBV and/or to which universal 
precautions apply; blood, semen, blood products, vaginal secretions, 
cerebrospinal fluid, synovial fluid, pleural fluid, peritoneal fluid, 
pericardia! fluid, amniotic fluid, and concentrated HIV or HBV 
viruses. 
6. Phlebotomist. A phlebotomist is any health care worker who 
principally draws blood samples. 
7. Infectious Control (IC) Program. An IC program is the establishment's 
written policy and implementation of those policies and procedures 
relating to the control of infectious disease hazards where employees 
may be exposed to direct contact with body fluids. An IC program must 
address all of the areas outlined in this directive. 
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8. Joint Advisory Notice. Department of Labor/Department of Health and 
Human Services-Joint Advisory Notice (Federal Register, Vol. 52, 
No. 210; October 30, 1987) is a list of recommendations developed to 
assist employers in implementing the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 
guidelines. 
C. BACKGROUND. In September 1986, OSHA was petitioned by various unions 
representing health care employees to develop a standard to protect workers 
from occupational exposure to blood-borne diseases. Although Federal OSHA 
has decided to pursue development of such a standard, as a result of recent 
rule-making petitions and OSHA's evaluation of those petitions, the Agency 
has concluded that the risk of contracting Hepatitis B and AIDS among 
members of various occupations within the health care system requires an 
immediate response through a variety of existing mechanisms. 
1. Occupational exposure may occur in many ways, including needlestick 
and cut injuries. Health care workers employed in certain occupations 
are assumed to be at high risk for blood-borne infections due to their 
routinely increased exposure to body fluids from potentially infected 
patients. These high-risk occupations include, but are not limited 
to, physicians, pathologists, dentists and dental technicians, x-ray 
technicians, phlebotomists, emergency room, intensive care and 
operating room nurses and technicians, laboratory and blood bank 
technologists and technicians. Other health care workers who may be 
directly exposed to such body fluids depending on their exact work 
assignments include such occupations as housekeeping personnel, 
laundry workers, orderlies, morticians, research laboratory workers, 
paramedics, medical examiners. Employees in any occupation where they 
are directly exposed to body fluids are considered to be at 
substantial risk of occupational exposure to HIV and/or HBV. 
2. Ward clerks and administrators have virtually no increased risk of 
contact with body fluids as a result of their employment; they are 
thus at no greater risk of contracting blood-borne diseases than other 
members of the general population. 
3. Neither HBV nor HIV is transmitted by casual contact in the work 
place. 
4. The employer's obligations are those set forth in the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act. However, the CDC has published guidelines to 
protect workers from HBV and HIV (See Appendices A & B) . I OSHA is 
relying on these guidelines as reflecting an appropriate and widely 
recognized and accepted standard of protection to be followed by 
health care employers in carrying out their responsibilities under the 
IOSHA Act. 
5. The same personal protective equipment and work practice.s used to 
prevent occupational transmission of HBV are effective in preventing 
occupational transmission of HIV. The CDC has called for use of 
"universal precautions" when working with blood and/or body fluids 
from any patient. 
6. One difference between the two viruses is that there is currently a 
vaccine to prevent HBV infection, which the CDC has recommended for 
persons at substantial risk of occupational exposure, but there is no 
vaccine for HIV. 
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D. INSPECTION PROCEDURES. The procedures given in the FOM, Chapter III, shall 
be followed except as modified in the following sections. 
1. When entering a hospital or health care facility, the CSHO shall 
locate the Hospital Administrator, the Medical Director or the person 
in charge and present credentials. 
2. Health care facilities generally administer internal IC programs. 
This function may be performed by a committee or an individual. Upon 
entry the CSHO shall request the presence of the infection control 
nurse(s) and/or other individual(s) who will be responsible for 
providing records pertinent to the inspection. 
3. Careful examination of the facility's IC program is the core element 
of these inspections. Occupational injury and illness records shall 
be carefully scrutinized, and employees selected from all appropriate 
areas of the facility shall be interviewed to verify both the accuracy 
of the OSHA-200 records and the effectiveness of the IC program. 
NOTE: Employers are not required normally to record needlesticks on 
the OSHA-200. However, if such needlesticks require medical treatment 
(i.e. , gamma globulin) and are identified as causes of diagnosed 
occupationally related AIDS, AIDS Related Complex, or Hepatitis B, 
they shall be recorded. 
4. In the event the facility being inspected does not have a written IC 
program, an appropriate citation (88.4) shall be issued. 
5. CSHOs shall use appropriate caution when entering patient care areas 
of the facility. When such visits are judged necessary for 
determining actual conditions in the facility, the privacy of patients 
shall be respected. Photographs of patients will not normally be 
necessary and in no event shall identifiable photographs be taken 
without their consent. 
6. The walkaround portion of the inspection shall consist of a spot-check 
approach. The CSHO shall identify on the basis of professional 
judgment what areas should be physically checked out and to what 
extent. The CSHO is to be satisfied that an IC program is in place 
and judged to be effective. 
7. If an inspection is conducted in an establishment outside of SIC codes 
80** and 7261, and a health care unit is on site, the provisions of 
Section D apply and shall be enforced. 
E. FEDERAL AGENCY FACILITIES. Health care facilities owned by agencies of the 
Federal Government are subject to inspection. However, they do not fall 
under the jurisdiction of the IOSH Act and will be referred to the U.S. 
Department of Labor OSH Administration. 
F. CITATION POLICY. The provisions of the Field Operation Manual (FOM), 
Chapters IV and V, shall be followed when issuing citations for hazards 
related to blood-borne infectious diseases. 
1. The following requirements apply when citing hazards found in health 
care facilities. Employers must comply with the provisions of these 
requirements whenever an employee may reasonably be expected to have 
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direct contact with body fluids regardless of whether the patient is 
known to have been infected with HBV or HIV. This policy is based on 
the widespread nature of these viruses and the consequent risk to the 
health care workers described above. It is also based on the need to 
maintain patient confidentiality and HBV and HIV testing limitations. 
o 1910.132--Personal protective equipment. 
o 1910.22(a)(l) and (a)(2)--General requirements, Housekeeping. 
o 1910.141(a)(4)(i) and (ii)--Sanitation, Waste disposal. 
o 1910.145(f)--Specifications for accident prevention signs and 
tags. 
o Iowa Code Section 88.4--General Duty Clause. 
2. Whenever a hazardous condition exists that is not covered by one of 
the standards listed above, and the decision is made not to cite the 
condition under the general duty clause, an appropriate letter shall 
be sent advising the employer of the hazardous conditions and 
suggesting corrective action. 
3. Such recommendations made to employers shall be noted in the case file 
for special attention in subsequent inspections. 
4. Multi-Employer Work Site. The following citation guidelines apply in 
multi-employer work sites. 
(a) Health care facilities shall be cited for standards and Section 
88.4 violations to which their own employees are exposed. 
(b) They shall also be cited for standards (but not Section 88.4) 
violations to which employees of other employers on their 
premises are exposed to the extent that they control the hazard. 
For example, they shall be cited for not providing personal 
protective equipment to unprotected employees of other employers 
on their premises. 
(c) Physicians who are members of professional corporations are 
generally considered to be employees of that corporation. 
Therefore, the corporation may be cited for all violations 
affecting those physicians. Hospitals where they work may also 
be cited for standards violations (but not Section 88.4) to which 
they are exposed. 
(d) No citation shall be issued where the only persons exposed are 
physicians who are sole practitioners or partners, and thus not 
employees under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 
G. VIOLATIONS. The IC program shall be carefully evaluated to determine 
compliance with IOSHA requirements, as clarified by those CDC guidelines 
relating to health care worker safety and health. The description of the 
IOSHA requirements in this section is based upon those guidelines. 
Violations of IOSHA requirements will normally be classified as serious. 
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1. 1910.132(a) and (c). The standard provides in pertinent part: 
"(a) Application. Protective equipment, including personal protective 
equipment for eyes, face, head, and extremities, protective clothing, 
respiratory devices, and protective shields and barriers, shall be 
provided, used, and maintained in a sanitary and reliable condition 
wherever it is necessary by reason of hazards of processes or 
environment, . . . encountered in a manner capable of causing injury 
or impairment in the function of any part of the body through 
absorption, inhalation or physical contact. 
(c) Design. All personal protective equipment shall be of safe design 
and construction for work to be performed." 
The following personal protective measures shall have been addressed by the 
IC program and verified by interviews and walkaround: 
(a) Gloves. The use of gloves will vary according to the procedure 
involved. The use of disposable gloves is indicated for 
procedures where body fluids are handled. 
(1) The use of gloves is particularly important in the following 
circumstances: 
~ If the health care worker has cuts, abraded skin, chapped 
hands, dermatitis or the like. 
Q During instrumental examination of otopharynx, 
gastrointestinal tract and genitourinary tract . 
.f. When examining abraded or non- intact skin or patients 
with active bleeding. 
d During invasive procedures. 
~ During all cleaning of body fluids and decontaminating 
procedures. 
(2) Gloves must be of appropriate material, usually intact latex 
or intact vinyl, of appropriate quality for the procedures 
performed, and of appropriate size for each health care 
worker. Where gloves do not meet these requirements 
1910.132(c) shall be cited. 
( 3) Employers shall not wash or dis infect surgical or 
examination gloves for reuse. 
(4) General purpose utility (rubber) gloves worn by maintenance, 
housekeeping, laundry or other non-medical personnel may be 
decontaminated and reused. 
(5) No gloves shall be used if they are peeling, cracked, or 
discolored, or if they have punctures, tears, or other 
evidence of deterioration. Failure to meet these 
requirements shall be cited under 1910.132(c). 
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(b) Gowns. The use of gowns, aprons, or lab coats is required when 
splashes to skin or clothing with body fluids are likely to 
occur. Gowns, including surgical gowns, shall be made of or 
lined with impervious material and shall protect all areas of 
exposed skin. 
(c) Masks and Eye Protectors. The use of masks and protective 
eyewear or face shields is required when contamination of mucosal 
membranes (eyes, mouth or nose) with body fluids such as splashes 
or aerosolization of such material (e. g., during surgical or 
dental procedures), is likely to occur. They are not required 
for routine care. 
(d) Resuscitation Equipment. Pocket masks, resuscitation bags, or 
other ventilation devices shall be provided in strategic 
locations, as well as to key personnel (e.g., paramedics) where 
the need for resuscitation is likely. This will minimize the 
need for emergency mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. 
(e) Invasive Procedures. Personal protective equipment as described 
above shall be used when performing invasive procedures to avo~d 
exposure. When a health care worker's skin or mucous membranes 
may come in conta.ct with body fluids, gowns, masks, and eye 
protection shall be worn, as noted above. 
(f) Phlebotomy. Gloves shall be provided and used by phlebotomists. 
Employers who do not make them available shall be cited for 
failure to provide under 1910.132(a). Employers who make gloves 
available, but discourage or prohibit their use shall be cited 
for failure to use under 1910.132(a), if in fact the gloves are 
not being used. However, no citation for failure to use shall be 
issued where the phlebotomist voluntarily and without the 
encouragement of the employer does not wear gloves, unless the 
following circumstances exist: 
( 1) For performing phlebotomy when the health care worker has 
cuts, scratches, or other breaks in his/her skin. 
(2) In situations where the CSHO and/or health care worker 
judges that hand contamination with blood may occur, for 
example, when performing phlebotomy on an uncooperative 
patient. 
(3) For performing finger and/or heel sticks in infants and 
children. 
(4) When persons are receiving training in phlebotomy. 
(g) Dentistry. Gloves are required for contact with oral mucous 
membranes. Surgical masks and protective eyewear or chin-length 
plastic face shields are required during dental procedures in 
which splashing, spattering or aerosolization of blood, saliva or 
gingival fluids is likely. (Saliva and gingival fluids are 




(h) Laboratories. The use of gloves is required for processing body 
fluid specimens. Masks and protective eyewear are required when 
the worker's mucosal membranes may come in contact with body 
fluids. 
(i) Postmortem Procedures. Persons performing or assisting in 
postmortem procedures are required to wear personal protective 
equipment as noted above to avoid exposure to body fluids. 
2. 1910.22(a)(1) and (a)(2). The standard provides in pertinent part: 
"(a) Housekeeping. 
(1) All places of employment, passageways, storerooms, and 
service rooms shall be kept clean and orderly and in a 
sanitary condition. 
(2) The floor of every workroom shall be maintained in a clean 
and, so far as possible, a dry condition .... " 
The IC program shall have identified housekeeping operations involving 
substantial risk of direct exposure to body fluids and shall be 
addressed the proper precautions to be taken while cleaning rooms and 
blood spills. The application of these procedures shall be verified 
by employee interviews and the walkaround. 
(a) Room Cleaning Where Body Fluids are Present. Schedules shall be 
as frequent as necessary according to the area of the 
institution, type of surface to be cleaned, and the amount and 
type of soil present. 
(b) Disinfectants. Chemical germicides that are approved for use as 
hospital disinfectants and are tuberculocidal when used at 
recommended dilutions shall be used to decontaminate spills of 
blood and other body fluids. A solution of 5.25 percent sodium 
hypochlorite (household bleach) diluted between 1: 10 and 1: 100 
with water or other suitable disinfectant shall be used for 
disinfection following the initial cleanup. 
3. 1910.141(a)(4)(i) and (ii). The standard provides in pertinent part: 
"(4) Waste disposal. 
( i) Any receptacle used for putrescible solid or liquid waste or 
refuse shall be so constructed that it does not leak or overflow 
and may be thoroughly cleaned and maintained in a sanitary 
condition. Such a receptacle shall be equipped with a solid, 
tight-fitting cover, unless it can be maintained in a sanitary 
condition without a cover. This requirement does not prohibit 
the use of receptacles which are designed to permit the 
maintenance of a sanitary , condition without regard to the 
aforementioned requirements. 
(ii) All sweepings, solid or liquid wastes, refuse, and garbage shall 
be removed in such a manner as to avoid creating a menace to 
health and as often as necessary or appropriate to maintain the 
place of employment in a sanitary condition." 
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The IC program shall have addressed the handling and disposal of the 
following potentially contaminated items. The effectiveness of the 
program in this regard shall be verified through employee interviews 
and the walkaround. 
(a) Sharp Instruments and Disposable Items. Needles shall not be 
recapped, purposely bent, or broken by hand, removed from 
disposable syringes, or otherwise manipulated by hand. 
(1) After they are used, disposable syringes and needles, 
scalpel blades, and other sharp items shall be placed in 
puncture-resistant containers for disposal. 
(2) Such containers shall be easily accessible to personnel 
needing them and located in all areas where needles are 
commonly used, including emergency rooms, intensive care 
units, and surgical suites and shall be so constructed that 
they will not spill their contents if knocked over and will 
not themselves allow injuries when handled. 
(3) These containers shall also be located on patient floors and 
any other setting where blood is drawn and needles are used. 
(b) Lab Specimens. All specimens of body fluids shall be put in a 
well constructed container with a secure lid to prevent leaking 
during transport and shall be disposed of in an approved manner. 
Contaminated materials used in laboratory tests should be 
decontaminated before reprocessing or be placed in bags and 
disposed of in accordance with institutional policies for 
disposal of infectious waste. 
4. 1910.145(f). The standard provides in pertinent part: 
"(f)(3) Use. Tags shall be used as means to prevent accidental 1nJury 
or illness to employees who are exposed to hazardous or potentially 
hazardous conditions, equipment or operations which are out of the 
ordinary, unexpected or not readily apparent. Tags shall be used 
until such time as the identified hazard is eliminated or the 
hazardous operation is completed. Tags need not be used where signs, 
guarding or other positive means of protection are being used. 
(4) General tag criteria. All required tags shall meet the following 
criteria: 
(i) Tags shall contain a signal word and a major message. 
(a) The signal word shall be . . . 'BIOHAZARD,' 
biological hazard symbol. 
or the 
(b) The major message shall indicate the specific hazardous 
condition or the instruction to be communicated to the employee. 
(ii) The signal word shall be readable at a minimum distance of five 
feet (1.52m) or such greater distance as warranted by the hazard. 
(iii) The tag's major message shall be presented in either 
pictographs, written text or both. 
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(iv) The signal word and the major message shall be understandable to 
all employees who may be exposed to the identified hazard. 
(v) All employees shall be informed as to the meaning of the various 
tags used throughout the work place and what special precautions are 
necessary. 
(vi) Tags shall be affixed as close as safely possible to their 
respective hazards by a positive means such as string, wire, or 
adhesive that prevents their loss or unintentional removal. 
(f)(8) Biological hazard tags. 
(i) Biological hazard tags shall be used to identify the actual or 
potential presence of a biological hazard, including those body fluids 
listed in B.4, and to identify equipment, containers, rooms, 
experimental animals, or combinations thereof, that contain or are 
contaminated with hazardous biological agents." 
The IC program shall have addressed the labeling procedures to be 
followed in the facility. That these procedures are followed shall be 
confirmed by employee interviews and the walkaround. 
(a) Bags or other receptacles containing articles contaminated with 
potentially infectious material, including contaminated 
disposable items, must be tagged or otherwise identified. The 
tag shall have the signal word "BIOHAZARD" or the biological 
hazard symbol. The tag shall indicate that the bag could contain 
infectious wastes and give any additional instructions; e.g., if 
the outside of the bag is contaminated with body fluids, a second 
outer bag should be used. 
(b) Identification of potentially infective waste by means other than 
direct tagging; i.e., color coding, etc., shall only be 
permissible if the infective waste is incinerated or sterilized 
inhouse. Infective waste transported off site must be tagged in 
accordance with 1910.145(f). 
(c) Employees shall be informed of the meaning of tags. With respect 
to tagged material, they shall also be instructed to use double 
bagging where puncture or outside contamination is likely. 
5. Iowa Code Section 88.4. Section 88.4 provides: 
"Each employer shall furnish to each of the employee's employment and 
a place of employment which is free from recognized hazards that are 
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to the 
employer's employees;" 
(a) Section 88.4 citations must meet the requirements outlined in the. 
FOM, Chapter IV, and can be issued only where there is a hazard 
which cannot be abated by implementing an abatement method 
required by the standards above. All applicable abatement 
methods identified as correcting the same hazard shall be issued 
under a single 88.4 citation. 
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(b) If a citation under Section 88.4 is justified, the citation, 
after setting forth the SAVE for 88. 4, shall sta.te: 
Health care workers (specify categories, such as doctors, 
nurses, etc.) (Specify location) were exposed to the hazard 
of being infected by HBV and/or HIV through possible direct 
contact with blood or other body fluids. Feasible and 
useful abatement methods for reducing this hazard, among 
others, are: (List abatement methods not required by the 
standards which employer is not implementing.) 
(c) Recognition for purposes of citing Section 88.4 is recognition of 
the hazard of being infected with HBV and/or HIV or through 
possible direct contact with body fluids. The health care 
industry generally accepts and, therefore, recognizes the 
determination of this hazard by the CDC, which is the 
acknowledged authority in this area. The employer's IC program 
can also constitute evidence of recognition. 
(d) The following are examples of feasible and useful abatement 
methods. The non-use of any of these methods is likely to result 
in the continued existence of a serious hazard and, may, 
therefore, allow citation under Section 88.4. Consequently, all 
of these methods shall have been implemented. To determine 
whether they are being implemented, the CSHO shall evaluate the 
IC program and verify with employee interviews and the 
walkaround. 
(1) Hepatitis B Vaccination. The facility's IC policy regarding 
Hepatitis B vaccinations shall address all circumstances 
warranting such vaccinations and shall identify employees at 
substantial risk of directly contacting body fluids. All 
such employees shall be offered Hepatitis B vaccinations, at 
no cost, in amounts and at times prescribed by standard 
medical practice. 
(2) Linen. The IC program shall have identified all laundry 
operations involving substantial risk of direct exposure to 
body fluids. Linen soiled with body fluids shall be handled 
as little as possible and with minimum agitation to prevent 
contamination of the person handling the linen. 
(3) Reusable Equipment. Standard sterilization and disinfection 
procedures currently recommended for Hepatitis B in a 
variety of health care settings are adequate to sterilize or 
disinfect instruments, devices, or other items contaminated 
with body fluids. A recommended source of information is 
the CDC's Guideline for Hospital Environmental Control; 
Cleaning, Disinfection and Sterilization of Hospital 
Equipment. 
( 4) Bagging of Articles. Objects that are contaminated with 
potentially infectious materials shall be placed in an 
impervious bag. If outside contamination of the bag is 
likely, a second bag shall be used. 
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( 5) Handwashing. After removing gloves, hands or other skin 
surfaces shall be washed thoroughly and immediately after 
contact with body fluids. 
(6) Follow-Up Procedures After Possible Exposure to HIV/HBV: 
(a) If a health care worker has a percutaneous (needlestick 
or cut) or mucous membrane (splash to eye, nasal mucosa, or 
mouth) exposure to body fluids or has a cutaneous exposure 
to blood when the worker's skin is chapped, abraded, or 
otherwise non-intact, the source patient shall be informed 
of the incident and tested for HIV and HBV infections, after 
consent is obtained. 
(b) If patient consent is refused or if the source patient 
tests positive, the health care worker shall be 
evaluated clinically and by HIV antibody testing as 
soon as possible and advised to report and seek medical 
evaluation of any acute febrile illness that occurs 
within 12 weeks after exposure. HIV seronegative 
workers shall be retested 6 weeks post-exposure and on 
a periodic basis thereafter ( 12 weeks and 6 months 
after exposure). 
(c) Follow-up procedures shall be taken for health care 
workers exposed or potentially exposed to HBV. The 
types of procedures depend on the immunization status 
of the worker (i.e., whether HBV vaccination has been 
received and antibody response is adequate) and the HBV 
serologic status of the source patient. The CDC 
Immunization Practices Advisory Committee has published 
its recommendations regarding HBV post-exposure 
prophylaxis in table format in the June 7, 1985, 
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. 
(d) If an employee refuses to submit to the procedures in 
(b) or (c) above when such procedures are medically 
indicated, no adverse action can be taken on that 
ground alone since the procedures are designed for the 
benefit of the exposed employee. 
(7) Training and Education of Health Care Workers. The 
employer's training program shall be evaluated in accordance 
with Appendix C. 
(a) All high risk health care workers such as those listed 
in C.1. shall receive education on precautionary 
measures, epidemiology, modes of transmission and the 
prevention of HBV /HIV. Health care workers shall be 
counseled regarding possible risks to the fetus from 
HBV/HIV and other associated infectious agents. 
(b) In addition, such high risk workers must receive 
training regarding the location and proper use of 
personal protective equipment. They shall be trained 
concerning proper work practices and, if the facility 
has implemented them, shall understand the concept of 
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H. OTHER STANDARDS. 
"universal precautions" as it applies to their work 
practices. Where inhouse sterilization or incineration 
is used for infective waste, the workers shall be 
trained about the meaning of color coding or other 
effective methods used to designate contaminated 
articles and infectious waste. Where tags are used, 
training about tags and precautions to be used in 
handling contaminated articles or infectious waste is 
governed by 1910.145(f). (See section G.4.) Workers 
shall receive training about procedures to be used if 
they are exposed to needlestick or to body fluids. 
1. The hazard communication standard, lAC 347-110,120 only applies to 
hazardous chemicals or physical hazards in the work place and thus 
does not apply to biological hazards such as blood-borne diseases. 
2. A record concerning employee exposure to HIV and/or HBV is an employee 
exposure record within the meaning of 1910. 20. A record about HIV 
and/or HBV status is also an employee medical record within the 
meaning of 1910.20. However, the CSHO may obtain these records for 
purposes of determining compliance with 1910.20. 
3. Generally, 1910.134 does not apply since there are no respirators 
approved for biohazards. However, placing respirators in areas where 
they could be contaminated by body fluids constitutes a violation of 
1910.134(b)(6). 
I. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT FOR CSHOs. 
1. CSHOs shall not participate in activities that will require them to 
come into contact with body fluids, needles or other sharp instruments 
contaminated with blood. To evaluate such activities, CSHOs normally 
shall establish the existence of hazards and adequacy of work 
practices through employee interviews and shall observe them at a safe 
distance. 
2. CSHOs shall take necessary precautions to avoid direct contact with 
body fluids. It will not normally be necessary for CSHOs actually to 
enter hazardous areas and, therefore, to use personal protective 
equipment. On the rare occasions when entry into potentially 
hazardous areas is judged necessary, the CSHO shall be properly 
equipped as required by the health care facility as well as by his/her 
own professional judgment, after consultation with the supervisor 






June 24, I Vol. I 
Update: Unlverul Frtc:autllona 
Prevtntlon of Tranamiuion 
Immunodeficiency Virus, Hepatitis B 
Virus, and Other Bloodborne 
Pathogens in Health-Care s~tn1u·uut 
Disease Prevention and Health Promotion 
: U Prevention of Transmission of 
Immunodeficiency Hepatitis B Virus, and Other Bloodborne 
Pathogens Health-Care Settings 
The purpose of this report is to clarify and supplement the CDC publication entitled 
"Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings" 
( 1 ). * 
In 1983, CDC published a document entitled "Guideline for Isolation Precautions in 
Hospitals" (2) that contained a section entitled "Blood and Body Fluid Precautions .. " 
The recommendations in this section called for blood and body fluid precautions 
when a patient was known or suspected to be infected with blood borne pathogens. In 
August 1987, CDC published a document entitled "Recommendations for Prevention 
of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings" ( 1 ). In contrast to the 1983 document, 
the 1987 document recommended that blood and body fluid precautions be consis· 
tently used for all patients regardless of their bloodborne infection status. This 
extension of blood and body fluid precautions to !!! patients is referred to as 
"Universal Blood and Body Fluid Precautions" or "Universal Precautions." Under 
universal precautions, blood and certain body fluids of all patients are considered 
potentially infectious for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis B virus 
(HBV), and other b•oodborne pathoge~s. 
*The August 1987 publication should be consulted for general information and spedf~c 
recommendations not addressed in this update. 
A-1 
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uolr:ltlt1e: HIV ..... Continued 
Universal precautions are intended to prevent parenteral, mucous 
skin to bloodborne I"U:i11'11'!1.r'll,n~II''UlP 
immunization with 
universal precautions for who have to 
Since the recommendations for universal precautions were published 
CDC and the Food and Administration (FDA) have received 
clarification of the following 1) body fluids to which universal 
2) use of protective barriers, 3) use of gloves for phlebotomy, 4) sel~ectiion 
use while observing universal precautions, and 5) need for making rn~:an,.,~. 
in waste management programs as a result adopting universal precautions. 
I!Willalis-te to Which Apply 
Universal precautions 1 PPIY to blood and to other body fluids containing 
blood. Occupational transmission of HIV and HBV to health-care workers by 
documented (4,5 ). most important source of HIV, 
n•c~oaoo1rne pathogens in occupational setting. Infection control A""'lii"!hit 
other bloodborne pathogens must focus on preventing exw:;POSILU 
as well as on delivery of HBV immunization. 
Universal precautions also apply to semen and vaginal secretions. Although both 
of these fluids have been implicated in the sexual transmission of HIV and HBV, they 
have not been implicated in occupational transmission from patient to heaithecare 
worker. This observation is not unexpected, since exposure to semen in usual 
health-care setting is limited, and the routine practice of wearing gloves for perform-
ing vaginal examinations protects health-care workers from exposure to potentially 
infectious vaginal secretions. 
Universal precautions also apply to tissues and to the following fluids: cerebro-
spinal fluid (CSF), synovial fluid, pleural fluid, peritoneal fluid, pericardial fluid, and 
amniotic fluid. The risk of transmission of HIV and HBV from these fluids is unknown; 
epidemiologic studies in the health-care anl :ommunity setting are currently inade-
quate to assess the potential risk to health-care workers from occupational exposures 
to them. However, HIV has been isolated from CSF, synovial, and amniotic fluid (6--8 ), 
and HBsAg has been detected in synovial fluid, amniotic fluid, and peritoneal fluid 
(9-11 ). One case of HIV transmission was reported after a percutaneous exposure to 
bloody pleural fluid obtained by needle aspiration ( 12 ). Whereas aseptic procedures 
used to obtain these fluids for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes protect health-care 
workers from skin exposures, they cannot prevent penetrating injuries due to 
contaminated needles or other sharp instruments. 
Body Fluids to Which Universal Precautions Do Not Apply 
Universal precautions do not apply to feces, nasal secretions, sputum, sweat, 
tears, urine, and vomitus unless they contain visible blood. The risk of transmission 
of HIV and HBV from these fluids and materials is extremely low or nonexistent. HIV 
has been isolated and HBsAg has been demonstrated in some of these 
however, epidemiologic studies in the health-care and community setting have not 
implicated these fluids or materials in the transmission of HIV and HBV infections 
( 13,14 ). Some of the above fluids and excretions represent a potential source for 
nosocomial and community-acquired infections with other pathogens, and recom-
mendations for preventing the transmission of nonbloodborne pathogens have been 
published (2 ). 
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for Other Body fluids in Special Settings 
breast milk has been implicated in perinatal transmission of HIV, and 
has been found in the milk of mothers infected with HBV ( 10,13 ). However, 
exposure to human breast milk has not been implicated in the trans .. 
""uc:~C!!~~~.,~" of HIV nor HBV infection to health-care workers. Moreover, the health-care 
'U/,J,~,.IIf,:llr will not have the same type of intensive exposure to breast milk as the nursing 
neonate. Whereas universal precautions do not apply to human breast milk, gloves 
worn by health-care workers in situations where exposures to breast milk 
might be frequent, for example, in breast milk banking. 
:-o.e;!l••'-''lil of some persons infected with HBV has been shown to contain HBV-DNA at 
concentrations 111,000 to 1/10,000 of that found in the infected person's serum ( ). 
t1SJ~O··no~smlve sativa has been shown to be infectious when injected into experi-
animals and in human bite exposures ( 16--18 ). However, HBsAg-positive 
saliva not been shown to be infectious when applied to oral mucous membranes 
in experimental primate studies ( 18) or through contamination of musical instru-
ments or cardiopulmonary resuscitation dummies used by HBV carriers ( 19,20 ). 
Epidemiologic studies of nonsexual household contacts of HIV-infected patients, 
including several small series in which HIV transmission failed to occur after bites or 
percutaneous inoculation or contamination of cuts and open wounds with saliva 
from HIV-infected patients, suggest that the potential for salivary transmission of HIV 
is remote (5, 13,14,21,22 ). One case report from Germany has suggested the possi-
bility of transmission of HIV in a household setting from an infected child to a sibling 
through a human bite (23 ). -The bite did not break the skin or result in bleeding. Since 
the date of seroconversion to HIV was not known for either child in this case, evidence 
the role of saliva in the transmission of virus is unclear (23 ). Another case report 
suggested the possibility of transmission of HIV from husband to wife by contact with 
saliva during kissing (24 ). However, follow-up studies did not confirm HIV infection in 
the wife (27 ). 
Universal precautions do not apply to saliva. General infection control practices 
already in existence - including the use of gloves for digital examination of mucous 
membranes and endotracheal suctioning, and handwashing after exposure to 
saliva - shoutd further minimize the minute risk, if any, for salivary transmission of 
HIV and HBV ( 1,25 ). Gloves need not be worn when feeding patients and when 
wiping saliva from skin. 
Special precautions, however, are recommended for dentistry ( 1 ). Occupationally 
acquired infection with HBV in dental workers has been documented (4 ), and two 
possible cases of occupationally acquired HIV infection involving dentists have been 
reported (5,26 ). During dental procedures, contamination of saliva with blood is 
predictable, trauma to health-care workers' hands is common, and blood spattering 
may occur. Infection control precautions for dentistry minimize the potential for 
nonintact skin and mucous membrane contact of dental health-care workers to 
blood-contaminated saliva of patients. In addition, the use of gloves for oral 
examinations and treatment in the dental setting may also protect the patient's oral 
mucous membranes from exposures to blood, which may occur from breaks in the 
skin of dental workers' hands. 
of Protective Barriers 
Protective barriers reduce the risk of exposure of the health-care worker's skin or 
mucous membranes to potentially infective materials. For universal precau.tions, 
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"~~""''1i'll:lld""n.J'c barriers reduce the risk exposure to blood, body fluids containing visible 
other fluids to which universal precautions apply. Examples 
!R'Illo!I''II"Oli!!IIP<I!> include gloves, protective eyewear. Gloves should reduce 
incidence of contamination of hands, but they cannot prevent penetrating injuries 
to needles or other sharp instruments. Masks and protective eyewear or 
enacu,,Cl! should reduce the incidence contamination of mucous membranes 
nose, and 
'"uu.ar~::~~a precautions are intended to supplement rather than replace recommen-
routine infection control, such as handwashing and using gloves to 
microbial contamination hands (27 ). Because specifying the of 
II"U:II!I"'FU::!IIFU needed for possible clinical situation is impractical, some 
exercised. 
risk of nosocomial transmission of HIV, HBV, and other bloodborne n&""'"'•"'a"u! 
minimized ·if health-care workers use the following general guidelines:t 
care to prevent injuries when using needles, scalpels, and other sharp 
instruments or devices: when handling sharp instruments after procedures; when 
,...~~:~~s:anllnn used instruments: and when disposing of used needles. Do not recap 
used needles by hand; do not remove used needles from disposable by 
hand; and do not bend, break, or otherwise manipulate used needles by hand. 
disposable syringes and needles, scalpel blades, and other sharp items 
in puncture-resistant containers for disposal. Locate the puncture-resistant con-
tainers as close to the use area as is practical. 
Use protective barriers to prevent exposure to blood, body fluids containing visible 
blood, and other fluids to which universal precautions apply. The type of protective 
barrier(s) should be appropriate for the procedure being performed and the type of 
exposure anticipated. 
Immediately and thoroughly wash hands and other skin surfaces that are contam-
inated with blood, body fluids containing visible blood, or other body fluids to 
which universal precautions apply . 
.....,. • .._ ...... ""'Use for Phlebotomy 
Gloves should reduce the incidence of blood contamination of hands during 
phlebotomy (drawing bloori samples), but they cannot prevent penetrating injuries 
caused by needles or other sharp instruments. The likelihood of hand contamination 
with blood containing HIV, HBV, or other bloodborne pathogens during phlebotomy 
depends on several factors: 1) the skill and technique of the health-care worker, 2) the 
frequency with which the health-care worker performs the procedure (other factors 
being equal, the cumulative risk of blood exposure is higher for a health-care worker 
who performs more procedures), 3) whether the procedure occurs in a routine or 
emergency situation (where blood contact may be more likely), and 4) the prevalence 
infection with bloodborne pathogens in the patient population. The likelihood of 
infection after skin exposure to blood containing HIV or HBV will depend on the 
concentration of virus (viral concentration is much higher for hepatitis 8 than for HIV), 
the duration of contact, the presence of skin lesions on the hands of the health-care 
worker, and -for HBV -the immune status of the health-care worker. Although not 
accurately quantified, the risk of HIV infection following intact skin contact with 
infective blood is certainly much less than the 0.5o/o risk following percutaneous 
'The August 1987 publication should be consulted for general information and specific 
recommendations not addressed in this update. 
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needlestick exposures (5 ). In universal precautions, all blood is assumed to be 
potentially infective for bloodborne pathogens, but in certain settings (e.g., volunteer 
blood-donation centers) the prevalence of infection with some blood borne pathogens 
(e.g., HIV, HBV) is known to be very low. Some institutions have relaxed recommen-
dations for using gloves for phlebotomy procedures by skilled phlebotomists in 
•'5>ft't"itftR,.,~ where the prevalence of bloodborne pathogens is known to be very low. 
Institutions that judge that routine gloving for all phlebotomies is not necessary 
should periodi.cally reevaluate their policy. Gloves should always be available to 
health-care workers who wish to use them for phlebotomy. In addition, the following 
general guidelines apply: 
1. gloves for performing phlebotomy when the health-care worker has cuts, 
scratches, or other breaks in his/her skin. 
gloves in situations where the health-care worker judges that hand contami-
nation with blood may occur, for example, when performing phlebotomy on an 
uncooperative patient. 
3. Use gloves for performing finger and/or heel sticks on infants and children. 
4. Use gloves when persons are receiving training in phlebotomy. 
:;eaectao~n of Gi .. ,ves 
The Centf;r for Devices and Radiological Health, FDA, has responsibility for 
regulating tho medical glove industry. Medical gloves include those m~rketed as 
sterile surgical or nonsterile examination gloves made of vinyl or latex. General 
purpose utility ("rubber") gloves are also used in the health-care setting, but they are 
not regulated by FDA since they are not promoted for medical use. There are no 
reported differences in barrier effectiveness between intact latex and intact vinyl used 
to manufacture gloves. Thus, the type of gloves selected should be appropriate for 
the task being performed. 
The following general guidelines are recommended: 
1. sterile gloves for procedures involving contact with normally sterile areas of 
the body. 
2. Use examination gloves for procedures involving contact with mucous mem-
branes, unless otherwise indicated, and for other patient care or diagnostic 
procedures that do not require the use of sterile gloves. 
3. Change gloves between patient contacts. 
4. Do not wash or disinfect surgical or examination gloves for reuse. Washing with 
surfactants may cause "wicking," i.e., the enhanced penetration of liquids through 
undetected holes in the glove. Disinfecting agents may cause deterioration. 
Use general-purpose utility gloves (e.g., rubber household gloves) for housekeep-
ing chores involving potential blood contact and for instrument cleaning and 
decontamination procedures. Utility gloves may be decontaminated and reused 
but should be discarded if they are peeling, cracked, or discolored, or if they have 
punctures, tears, or other evidence of deterioration. 
w •.• .,. Management 
Universal precautions are not intended to change waste management programs 
previously recommended by CDC for health-care settings ( 1 ). Policies for defining, 
collecting, storing, decontaminating, and disposing of infective waste are generally 
determined by institutions in accordance with state and local regulations. Information 
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waste management regulations in health-care settings may obtained 
state or local health departments or agencies responsible for waste R'll~n~.n~c_ 
ment. 
_,...,..., ..... .,.,... by: Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Food and Drug Administration.·· 
noso~ruJI Infections Program, AIDS Program, and Hepatitis Br, Div of Viral Diseases, Center for 
mt18Ct1or..rs Diseases, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, CDC. 
li!DntiiTn•P•tiiU Note: Implementation of universal precautions does not eliminate the 
other category- or disease-specific isolation precautions, such as enteric 
for infectious diarrhea or isolation for pulmonary tuberculosis ( 1,2 ). In addition 
to universal precautions, detailed precautions have been developed for the following 
procedur~s and/or settings in which prolonged or intensive exposures to blood occur: 
invasive procedures, dentistry, autopsies or morticians' services, dialysis, and 
clinical laboratory. These detailed precautions are found in the August 
"Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings" ( 1 ). 
In addition, specific precautions have been developed for research laboratories (28 ). 
(Continued on page 387} 
I. Summary .... cases of specified notifiable diseases, United States 
24th Week Ending Cumulative, 24th Week Ending 
Dhuuule Jun. 18, I Jun. 20, l Median Jun. 18, I Jun. 20, I Median 1988 1987 1983·1987 1988 1987 1983-1987 
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) 198 u• 187 13,918 8,488 3.267 
Auptic meningitita 98 164 123 1,855 2,374 2,102 
Encepnalitia: Primary (arthropod-borne 
& unapec) 10 18 17 300 405 405 
Post-infectious 1 4 3 44 54 54 
Gonorrhea: Civilian 11,071 14,550 17,073 303,455 363,500 383,650 
Military 189 282 407 . 5,531 7,687 9,454 
Hepatitis: Type A 419 481 439 10,868 11,471 10,071 
Type B 351 479 532 9,614 11,666 11,451 
Non A, Non 8 51 60 74 1,137 1,461 1,623 
Unspecified 23 75 102 930 1,477 2.212 
leoionello1i1 18 16 16 376 399 314 
leproav 6 t 3 80 93 121 
Malaria 13 11 20 304 341 349 
Me11111a: Total' 21 92 92 1,406 2,379 1,620 
Indigenous 12 73 73 1,263 2,089 1,436 
lmponctd 9 "19 10 143 290 195 
Mening~l infections 44 55 55 1,592 1,648 1,575 
Mumpa 84 255 93 2,749 9,053 2,000 
Pertuui1 43 42 58 984 800 865 
Rubella (Germln meulnt 15 15 28 115 196 302 
Syphilis (Prim111ry & Secondary): Civilian 728 719 566 17,246 15,492 12,764 
Milit111ry 1 2 2 84 80 93 
Toxic Shock tyndrome 6 5 5 131 145 178 
Tuberculo1is 435 442 475 8,999 9,396 9,397 
Tularemia 7 9 8 68 64 68 
Typhoid Fev111r 6 6 5 159 136 136 
Typhua fever, tick-born• (RMSF) 27 35 35 130 154 1n 
Rabies, amimal · 78 85 111 1,874 2.368 2.368 
TABLE II. Notifiable diseases of low frequency, United Statei 
Cum. 1988 Cum. 1988 
Anthrax . lep«Otpiro&il 13 
Botulism: Foodborne (Md. H 10 Pl1gue 2 
lnf11nt 16 Poliomyelitis, P•ralytic . 
Other 2 Psittaeolil (Upstate N.Y. 1) • Brucellosis (Minn. 1t 28 Rabin. human .
Cholera . Tlllta~nua 20 
CongEDnit;l rubella ayndrome 3 Trichinosia (Alaska 28) » 
Congenital syphilis, ages < 1 year . 
Diphtheria . 
•Because AIDS CI!UUII are not received weeldy from 111 reporting areu. comparison of weekly figures may be mulleadeng. 
'Nina of tha 21 reponed cases for this week were imported from 111 foreign country or can be directly trKeable to a known 
internationally imported cas• w1thin two gener111tiona. 
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Recommendations for Prevention of HIV 
Transmission in Health-Care Settings 
Introduction 
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the virus that causes acquired immuno-
deficiency syndrome (AIDS), is transmitted through sexual contact and exposu.re to 
infected blood or blood components and peri natally from mother to neonate. HIV has 
been isolated from blood, semen, vaginal secretions, saliva, tears, breast milk, 
cerebrospinal fluid, amniotic fluid, and urine and is likely to be isolated from other 
body fluids, secretions, and excretions. However, epidemiologic evidence has impli-
cated only blood, semen, vaginal secretions, and possibly breast milk in transmission. 
The increasing prevalence of HIV increases the risk that health-care workers will be 
exposed to blood from patients infected with HIV, especially when blood and body-
fluid precautions are not followed for all patients. Thus, this document emphasizes 
the need for health-care workers to consider all patients as potentially infected with 
HIV and/or other blood-borne pathogens and to adhere rigorously to infection-control 
precautions for minimizing the risk of exposure to blood and body fluids of all 
patients. 
The recommendations contained in this document consolidate and update CDC 
recommendations published earlier for preventing HIV transmission in health-care 
settings: precautions for clinical and laboratory staffs ( 1 ) and precautions for 
health-care workers and allied professionals (2 ); recommendations for preventing-
HIV transmission in the workplace (3) and during invasive procedures (4 ); recom-
mendations for preventing possible transmission of HIV from tears (5 ); and recom-
mendations for providing dialysis treatment for HIV-infected patients (6 ). These 
recommendations also update portions of the "Guideline for Isolation Precautions in 
Hospitals" ( 7) and reemphasize some of the recommendations contained in "Infection 
Control Practices for Dentistry" (8 ). The recommendations contained in this docu-
ment have been developed for use in health-care settings and emphasize the need to 
treat blood and other body fluids from all patients as potentially infective. These same 
prudent precautions also should be taken in other settings in which persons may be 
exposed to blood or other body fluids. 
Definition of Health-Care Workers 
Health-care workers are defined as persons, including students and trainees, 
whose activities involve contact with patients or with blood or other body fluids from 
patients in a health-care setting. 
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Health-Care Workers with AIDS 
As of July 10, 1987, a total of 1,875 (5.8%) of 32,395 adults with AIDS, who had been 
reported to the CDC national surveillance system and .. for whom . occupational 
· information was available, reported being employed in a health-care or clinical 
laboratory setting. In comparison~ 6.8 million persons-representing 5.6% of the U.S. 
labor force-were employed in health services. Of the health-care wo~kers with AIDS, 
95% have been reported to exhibit high-risk behavior; for the remaining 5%, the 
means of HIV acquisition was undetermined. Health-care workers yvith AIDS were 
significantly more likely than other workers to have an undetermined risk (5% versus 
3%, respectively). For both health-care workers and non-health-care workers with 
AIDS, the proportion with an undetermined risk has not increased since 1982. 
AIDS patients initially reported as not belonging to recognized risk groups are 
investigated by state and local health departments to determine whether possible risk 
factors exist. Of all healt~-care workers with AIDS reported to CDC who were initially 
characterized as not having an identified risk and for whom follow-up information 
was available, 66% have been reclassified because risk factors were identified or 
because the patient was found not to meet the surveillance case definition for AIDS. 
Of the 87 health-care workers currently categorized as having no identifiable risk, 
information is incomplete on 16 (18%) because of death or refusal to be interviewed; 
38 (44%) are still being investigated. The remaining 33 (38%) health-care workers 
were interviewed or had other follow-up information available. The occupations of 
these 33 were as follows: five physicians (15%), three of whom were surgeons; one 
dentist (3%); three nurses (9%); nine nursing assistants (27%); seven housekeeping 
or maintenance workers (21%); three clinical laboratory technicians (9%); one 
therapist (3%); and four others who did not have contact with patients (12%). 
Although 15 of these 33 health-care workers reported parenteral and/or other 
non-needlestick exposure to blood or body fluids from patients in the 
10 years preceding their diagnosis of AIDS, none of these exposures involved a 
patient with AIDS or known HIV infection. 
Risk to Health-Care Workers of Acquiring HIV in Health-Care 
Settings 
Health-care workers with documented percutaneous or mucous-membrane expo-
sures to blood or body. fluids of HIV-infected patients have been prospectively 
evaluated to determine the risk of infection after such exposures. As of June 30, 1987, 
883 health-care workers have been testP.d for antibody to HIV in an ongoing 
surveillance project conducted by CDC (9 ). Of these, 708 (80%) had percutaneous 
exposures to blood, and 175 (20%) had a mucous membrane or an open wound 
contaminated by blood or body fluid. Of 396 health-care workers, each of whom had 
only a convalescent-phase serum sample obtained and tested ~90 days post-
exposure, one-for whom heterosexual transmission could not be ruled out--was 
seropositive for HIV antibody. For 425 additional health-care workers, both acute- and 
convalescent-phase serum samples were obtained and tested; none of 74 health-care 
workers with nonpercutaneous exposures seroconverted, and three (0.9%) of 351 
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yvith percutaneous exposures seroconverted. None of these three health-car~ workers 
had other documented risk factors for infection. 
Two other prospective studies to assess the risk of nosocomial acquisition of HIV 
infection for health-care workers are ongoing in the United States. As of April 30, 
1987, 332 health-care workers with a total of 453 needlestick or mucous-membrane 
exposures to the blood or other body fluids gf HIV-infected patients were tested for 
HIV antibody at the National Institutes of: Health ( 10 ). These expos.ed workers 
I 
included 103 with needlestick injuries and 229 with mucous-membrane exposures; 
none had seroconverted. A similar study at the University of California of 129 
health-care workers with documented needlestick injuries or mucous-membrane 
exposures to blood or other body fluids from patients with· HIV infection has not 
identified any seroconversions ( 11 }. Results of a prospective study in the United 
Kingdom identified no evidence of transmission among 150 health-care workers with 
parenteral or mucous-membrane exposures to blood or other body fluids, secretions, 
or excretions from patients with HIV infection ( 12 }. 
In addition to health-care workers enrolled in prospective studies, eight persons 
who provided care to infected patients and denied other risk factors have been 
reported to have acquired HIV infection. Three of these health-care workers had 
needlestick exposures to blood from infected patients ( 13-15 }. Two were persons 
who provided nursing care to infected persons; although neither sustained a 
needlestick, b·.:·th had extensive contact with blood or other body fluids, and neither 
observed recommended barrier precautions ( 16, 17 ). The other three were health-
care workers with non-needlestick exposures to blood from infected patients ( 18 ). 
Although the exact route of transmission for these last three infections is not known, 
all three persons had direct contact of their skin with blood from infected patients, all 
had skin lesions that may have been contaminated by blood, and one also had a 
mucous-membrane exposure. 
A total of 1,231 dentists and hygienists, many of whom practiced in areas with 
many AIDS cases, participated in a study to determine the prevalence of antibody to 
HIV; one dentist (0.1o/o} had HIV antibody. Although no exposure to a known 
HIV-infected person could be documented, epidemiologic investigation did not 
identify any other risk factor for infection. The infected dentist, who also had a history 
of sustaining needlestick injuries and trauma to his hands, did not routinely wear 
gloves when providing dental care ( 19 ). 
Precautions To Prevent Transmission of HIV 
Universal Precautions 
Since medical history and examination cannot reliably identify all patients infected 
with HIV or other blood-borne pathogens, blood and body-fluid precautions should 
be consistently used for all patients. This approach, previously recommended by CDC 
(3,4 ), and referred to as-;universal blood and body-fluid precautions" or "universal 
precautions," should be used in the care of all patients, especially including those in 
emergency-care settings in which the risk of blood exposure is increased and the 
infection status of the patient is usually unknown (20 ). 
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1. All health-care workers routinely use appropriate barrier to 
prevent skin and exposure when contact with blood or 
other body fluids of any is antiCipated.- Gloves should be worn for 
touching blood and body fluids,' mucous membranes, or non-intact skin of all 
patients, for handling items or with blood or fluids,·and for 
performing venipuncture and other vascular access procedures. Gloves should 
be changed after contact with each patient .. Masks and protective eyewear or 
face shields should worn during procedures. that are likely to generate 
droplets of blood or fluids to prevent ~xposure of mucous mem-
branes of the mouth, nose, and Gowns or aprons should be worn during 
procedures that are likely to splashes of blood or other fluids. 
2. Hands and other skin surfaces should washed immediately and thoroughly 
if contaminated with blood or body fluids. Hands should washed 
immediately after gloves are removed. 
3. All health-care workers should take precautions to prevent injuries caused by 
needles, scalpels, and other sharp instruments or devices during procedures; 
when cleaning used instruments; during disposal of used needles; and when 
handling sharp instruments after procedures. To prevent needlestick injuries, 
needles should not be recapped, purposely bent or broken by hand, removed 
from disposable syringes, or otherwise manipulated by hand. After they are 
used, disposable syringes and needles, scalpel blades, and other sharp items 
should be placed in puncture-resistant containers for disposal; the puncture-
resistant containers should be located as close as practical to the use area. 
Large-bore reusable needles should be placed in a puncture-resistant container 
for transport to the reprocessing area. 
4. Although saliva has not been implicated in HIV transmission, to minimize the 
need for emergency mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, mouthpieces, resuscitation 
bags, or other ventilation devices shol(ld be available for use in areas in which 
the need for resuscitation is predictable. 
5. Health-care workers who have exudative lesions or weeping dermatitis should 
refrain from all direct patient care and from handling patient-care equipment 
until the condition resolves. 
6. Pregnant health-care workers are not known to be at greater risk of contracting 
HIV infection than health-care workers who are not pregnant; however, if a 
health-care worker develops HIV infection during pregnancy, the infant is at risk 
of infection resulting from perinatal transmission. Because of this risk, pregnant 
health-care workers should be especially familiar with and strictly adhere to 
precautions to minimize the risk of HIV transmission. 
Implementation of universal blood and body-fluid precautions for all patients 
eliminates the need for use of the isolation category of "Blood and Body Fluid 
Precautions" previously recommended by CDC ( 7) for patients known or suspected to 
be infected with blood-borne pathogens. Isolation precautions (e.g., enteric, 
II AFB" [ 7 ]) should be used as necessary if associated conditions, such as infectious 
diarrhea or tuberculosis, are diagnosed or suspected. 
Precautions for Invasive Pn:>c~~<ULUE~s 
In this document, an invasive procedure is defined as surgical entry into tissues, 
cavities, or organs or repair of major traumatic injuries 1) in an operating ot delivery 
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room, emergency department, or outpatient se~ing, including both physicians' and 
dentists' offices; 2) cardiac catheterization and angiographic procedures; 3) a vaginal 
or cesarean delivery or other invasive obstetric procedure during which bleeding may 
occur; or 4) the manipulation, cutting, or removal ·of any oral or perioral tissues, 
including .tooth structure, during which bleeding occurs or the potential for bleeding 
exists. The universal blood and body-fluid precautions listed above, combin_ed with 
the precautions listed below, should be the minimum precautions for .all such 
invasive procedures. . 
1. ·All health-care workers who participate in invasive procedures must routinely 
use appropriate barrier precautions to prevent skin and mucous-m~mbrane 
contact with blood and other body fluids of all patients. Gloves and surgical 
masks must be worn for all invasive procedures. Protective eyewear or face 
shields should be worn for procedures that commonly result in the generation 
of droplets, splashing of blood or other body fluids, or the generation of bone 
chips. Gowns or aprons made of materials that provide an effective barrier 
should be worn during invasive procedures that are likely to result in the 
splashing of blood or other body fluids. All health-care wor1-:ers who perform or 
assist in vaginal or cesarean deliveries should wear gloves and gowns when 
handling the placenta or the infant until blood and amniotic fluid have been 
removed from the infant's skin and should wear gloves during post-delivery 
care of the umbilical cord. 
2. If a glove is torn or a needlestick or other injury occurs, the glove should be 
removed and a new glove used as promptly as patient safety permits; the 
needle or instrument involved in the incident should also be removed from the 
sterile field. 
Precautions for Dentistry* 
Blood, saliva, and gingival fluid from all dental patients should be considered 
infective. Special emphasis should be placed on the following precautions for 
preventing transmission of blood-borne pathogens in dental practice in both institu-
tional and non-institutional settings. 
1. In addition to ·wearing gloves for contact with oral mucous membranes of all 
patients, all dental workers should wear surgical masks and protective eyewear 
or chin-length plastic face shields during dental procedures in which splashing 
or spattering of blood, saliva, or gingival fluids is likely. Rubber dams, high-
speed evacuation, and proper patient positioning, when appropriate, should be 
utilized to minimize generation of droplets and spatter. 
2. Handpieces should be sterilized after use with each patient, since blood, saliva, 
or gingival fluid of patients may be aspirated into the handpiece or waterline. 
Handpieces that cannot be sterilized should at least be flushed, the outside 
surface cleaned and wiped with a suitable chemical germicide, and then rinsed. 
Handpieces should be flushed at the beginning of the day and after use with 
each patient. Manufacturers' recommendations should be followed for use and 
maintenance of waterlines and check valves and for flushing of hand pieces. The 
same precautions should .be used for ultrasonic scalers and air/water syringes. 
*General infection-control precautions are more specifically addressed in previous recommen-
dations for infection-control practices for dentistry (8 ). 
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3. 'Blood and saliva should be thoroughly and carefully cleaned from material that 
has been ·-used in the mouth (e.g.,· impr~sion materials, bite registration), 
especially before_ polishing and grinding intra-oral devices. Contaminated 
materials, impressions, and intra-oral devices should also be cleaned and 
disinfected before being handled in the dental laboratory and before they are 
placed in the patient's mouth.- Because of the increasing variety of dental 
materials used intra-orally, .dental workers should consult with manufacturers 
as to the stabilitY of specific materials when using disinfection procedures. 
4~ Dental equip-ment and surfaces that are difficult to disinfect (e.g.; light handles 
or X-ray-unit heads) and that may become contaminated should be wrapped 
with impervious-backed paper, aluminum foil, or clear plastic wrap. The 
coverings should be removed and discarded, and clean coverings should be put 
in place after use with each patient. 
Precautions for Autopsies or Morticians' Services 
In addition to the universal blood and body-fluid precautions listed above, the 
following precautions should be used by persons performing postmortem 
procedures: 
1. All persons performing or assisting in postmortem procedures should wear 
gloves, masks, protective eyewear, gowns, and waterproof aprons. 
2. Instruments and surfaces contaminated during postn1ortem procedures should 
be decontaminated with an appropriate chemical germicide. 
Precautions for Dialysis 
Patients with end-stage renal disease who are undergoing maintenance dialysis 
and who have HIV infection can be dialyzed in hospital-based or free-standing dialysis 
units using conventional infection-control precautions (21 ). Universal blood and 
body-fluid precautions should be used when dialyzing all patients. 
Strategies for disinfecting the dialysis fluid pathways of the hemodialysis machine 
are targeted to control bacterial contamination and generally consist of using 500-750 
parts per million (ppm) of sodium hypochlorite (household bleach) for 30-40 minutes 
or 1.5o/o-2.0% formaldehyde overnight. In addition, several chemical germicides 
formulated to disinfect dialysis machines are commercially available. None of these 
protocols or procedures need to be changed for dialyzing patients infected with HIV. 
Patients infected with HIV can be dialyzed by either hemodialysis or peritoneal 
dialysis and do not need to be isolated from other patients. The type of dialysis 
treatment (i.e., hemodialysis or peritoneal dialysis) should be based on the needs of 
the patient. The dialyzer may be discarded after each use. Alternatively, centers that 
reuse diafyzers- i.e., a specific single-use dialyzer is issued to a specific patient, 
removed, cleaned, disinfected, and reused several times on the same patient only-
may include HIV-infected patients in the dialyzer-reuse program. An individual 
dialyzer must never be used on more than one patient. 
Precautions for laboratories t 
Blood and other body fluids from all patients should be considered infective. To 
supplement the universal blood and body-fluid precautions listed above, the follow-
ing precautions are recommended for health-care workers in clinical laboratories. 
t Additional precautions for research and industrial laboratories are addressed elsewhere 
(22,23). 
B-6 
1. All specimens of blood and body fluids should be put in a well-constructed 
container with a secure lid to prevent leaking during transport. Care should be 
taken when collecting each sp~cimen to avoid contaminating."th~ outside of the 
container and of the laboratory fori"!" accompanying the specimen. 
·2. All persons processing blood and boay-fluid· specimens (e.g., removing tops 
from. vacuum tubes) should wear gloves. Masks and protective eyewear should 
be worn if mucous-membrane contact with blood or body fluids is anticipated. 
Gloves should b~ changed and hands· washed after completion of specimen 
processing. . 
3. For routine procedures, sych as histologic and pathologic studi~s or microbio-
logic culturing, a biological safety cabinet is not necessary. However, biological 
safety cabinets (Class I or II) should be used whenever procedures are con-
ducted that have a high potential for generating droplets. These include 
activities such as blending, sonicating, and vigorous mixing. 
4. Mechanical pipetting devices should be used for manipulating all liquids in the 
laboratory. Mouth pipetting must not be done. 
5. Use of needles and syringes should be limited to situations in which there is no 
alternative, and the recommendations for preventing injuries with needles 
outlined under universal precautions should be followed. 
6. Laboratory work surfaces should be decontaminated with an appropriate 
chemical germicide after a spill of blood or other body fluids and when work 
activities are completed. 
7. Contaminated materials used in laboratory tests should be decontaminated 
before reprocessing or be placed in bags and disposed of in accordance with 
institutional policies for disposal of infective waste (24 ). 
8. Scientific equipment that has been contaminated with blood or other body 
fluids should be decontaminated and cleaned before being repaired in the 
laboratory or transported to the manufacturer. 
9. All persons should wash their hands after completing laboratory activities and 
should remove protective clothing before leaving the laboratory. 
Implementation of universal blood and body-fluid precautions for all patients 
eliminates the need for warning labels on specimens since blood and other body 
fluids from all patients should be considered infective. 
Environmental Considerations for HIV Transmission 
No environmentally mediated mode of HIV transmission has been documented. 
Nevertheless, the precautions described below should be taken routinely in the care 
of all patients. 
Sterilization and Disinfection 
Standard sterilization and disinfection procedures for patient-care equipment 
currently recommended for use (25,26) in a variety of health-care settings- including 
hospitals, medical and dental clinics and offices, hemodialysis centers, emergency-
care facilities, and long-term nursing-care facilities- are adequate to sterilize or 
disinfect instruments, devices, or other items contaminated with blood or other body 
fluids from persons infected with blood-borne pathogens including HIV (21,23 ). 
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Instruments or devices that enter sterile .. tissue or the vascul.ar system of any 
patient or through which blood flows should be sterilized before reuse.- Devices or 
items that contact intact mucous membranes should be· sterilized or receive high-
level disinfection, a procedure that kills vegetative organisms and viruses but not 
necessarily large numbers of bacterial spores. Chemical germicides thait are regis-
tered with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency .(EPA) as "sterilants" may be 
used either for sterilization or for high-level disinfection depending on contact time. 
Contact lenses used in trial fittings should be disinfected after each fitting by using 
a hydrogen peroxide contact lens disinfecting system or, if compatible, with heat 
(78 C-80 C [172.4 F-176.0 F]) for 10 minutes. 
Medical devices or instruments that require sterilization or disinfection should be 
thoroughly cleaned before being exposed to the germicide, and the manufacturer's 
instructions for the use of the germicide should be followed. Further, it is important 
that the manufacturer's specifications for compatibility of the medical device with 
chemical germicides be closely followed. Information on specific label claims of 
commercial germicides can be obtained by writing to the Disinfectants Branch, Office 
of Pesticides, Environmental Protection Agency, 401 M Street, SW, Washington, D.C. 
20460. 
Studies have shown that HIV is inactivated rapidly after being exposed to 
commonly used chemical germicides at concentrations that are much lower than 
used in practice (27-30 ). Embalming fluids are similar to the types of chemical 
germicides that have been tested and found to completely inactivate HIV. In addition 
to commercially available chemical germicides, a solution of sodium hypochlorite 
(household bleach) prepared daily is an inexpensive and effective germicide. Con-
centrations ranging from approximately 500 ppm (1: 100 dilution of household 
bleach) sodium hypochlorite to 5,000 ppm (1 :10 dilution of household bleach) are 
effective depending on the amount of organic material (e.g., blood, mucus) present 
on the surface to be cleaned and disinfected. Commercially available chemical 
germicides may be more compatible with certain medical devices that might be 
corroded by repeated exposure to sodium hypochlorite, especially to the 1:10 
dilution. 
Survival of HIV in the Environment 
The most extensive study •Jn the survival of HIV after drying .involved greatly 
concentrated HIV samples, i.e., 10 million tissue-culture infectious doses per 
milliliter (31 ). This concentration is at least 100,000 times greater than that typically 
founrl in the blood or serum of patients with HIV infection. HIV was detectable by 
tissue-culture techniques 1-3 days after drying, but the rate of inactivation was rapid. 
Studies performed at CDC have also shown that drying HIV causes a rapid (within 
several hours) 1-2 log (90%-99%) reduction in HIV concentration. In tissue-culture 
fluid, cell-free HIV could be detected up to 15 days at room temperature, up to 11 days 
at 37 C (98.6 F), and up to 1 day if the HIV was cell-associated. 
When considered in the context of environmental conditions in health-care 
facilities, these results do not require any changes in currently recommended 
sterilization, disinfection, or housekeeping strategies. When medical devices are 
contaminated with blood or other body fluids, existing recommendations include the 
cleaning of these instruments, followed by disinfection or sterilization, depending on 
the type of medical device. These protocols assume "worst-case" conditions of 
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extreme ~irologic and microbiologic contamination, and -whether viruses have been 
inactivated after drying plays no role in formulating these strategies. Consequently, 
no changes in published procedures for cleaning, disinfecting, or sterilizing need to 
be made. 
Housekeeping 
Environmental surfaces such as walls, floors, and other surfaces are not associated 
with transmission of infections to patients or health-care workers. Therefore, extra-
ordinary attempts to disinfect or sterilize these environmental surfaces are not 
. necessary. However, cleaning and removal of soil should be done routinely. 
Cleaning schedules and methods vary according to the area of the hospital or 
institution, type of surface to be cleaned, and the amount and type of soil present. 
Horizontal surfaces (e.g., bedside tables and hard-surfaced flooring) in patient-care 
areas are usually cleaned on a regular basis, when soiling or spills occur, and when 
a patient is discharged. Cleaning of walls, blinds, and curtains is recommended only 
if they are visibly soiled. Disinfectant fogging is an unsatisfactory method of 
decontaminating air and surfaces and is not recommended. 
Disinfectant-detergent formulations registered by EPA can be used for cleaning 
environmental surfaces, but the actual physical removal of microorganisms by 
scrubbing is prc,oably at least as important as any antimicrobial effect of the cleaning 
agent used. Th;-:refore, cost, safety, and acceptability by housekeepers can be the 
main criteria for selecting any such registered agent. The manufacturers' instructions 
for appropriate use should be followed. 
Cleaning and Decontaminating Spills of Blood or Other Body Fluids 
Chemical germicides that are approved for use as "hospital disinfectants" and are 
tuberculocidal when used at recommended dilutions can be used to decontaminate 
spills of blood and other body fluids. Strategies for decontaminating spills of blood 
and other body fluids in a patient-care setting are different than for spills of cultures 
or other materials in clinical, public health, or research laboratories. In patient-care 
areas, visible material should first be removed arid then the area should be 
decontaminated. With large spills of cultured or concentrated infectious agents in the 
laboratory, the contaminated area should be flooded with a liquid germicide before 
cleaning, then decontaminated with fresh germicidal chemical. In both settings, 
gloves should be worn during the cleaning and decontaminating procedures. 
Laundry 
Although soiled linen has been identified as a source of large numbers of certain 
pathogenic microorganisms, the risk of actual disease transmission is negligible. 
Rather than rigid procedures and specifications, hygienic and common-sense storage 
and processing of clean and soiled linen are recommended (26 ). Soiled linen should 
be handled as little as possible and with minimum agitation to prevent gross 
microbial contamination of the air and of persons handling the linen. All soiled linen 
should be bagged at the location where it was used; it should not be sorted or rinsed 
in patient-care areas. Linen soiled with blood or body fluids should be placed and 
transported in bags that prevent leakage. If hot water is used, linen should be washed 
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with detergent in water at least 71 C (160 F) for 25 minutes. If low-temperature(:s;;70 C 
[158 F)) laundry cycles are used, chemicals suitable for low-temperature washing at 
prop~r use concentration should be used. 
There is no epidemiolog-ic evidence to suggest that most hospital waste is any 
more infective than residential waste. Moreover, th~re is no epidemiologic evidence 
·that hospital waste has caused disease in the community as a result of improper 
disposal. Therefore, identifying wastes for which special precautions are indicated is 
largely a matter of judgment about the relative risk of disease transmission. The most 
practical approach to the management of infective waste is to identify those wastes 
with the potential for causing infection during handling and disposal and for which 
some special precautions appear prudent. Hospital wastes for which special precau-
tions appear prudent include microbiology laboratory waste, pathology waste, and 
blood specimens or blood products. While any item that has had contact with blood, 
exudates, or secretions may be potentially infective, it is not usually considered 
practical or necessary to treat all such waste as infective (23,26 ). Infective waste, in 
general, should either be incinerated or should be autoclaved before disposal in a 
sanitary landfill. Bulk blood, suctioned fluids, excretions, and secretions may be 
carefully poured down a drain connected to a sanitary sewer. Sanitary sewers may 
also be used to dispose of other infectious wastes capable of being ground and 
flushed into the sewer. 
Implementation of Recommended Precautions 
Employers of health-care workers should ensure that policies exist for: 
1. Initial orientation and continuing education and training of all health-care 
workers- including students and trainees-on the epidemiology, modes of 
transmission, a!1d prevention of HIV and other blood-borne infections and the 
need for routine use of universal blood and body-fluid precautions for ~ 
patients. 
2. Provision of equipment and supplies necessary to minimize the risk of infection 
with HIV and other blood-borne pathogens. 
3. Monitoring adherence to recommended protective measures. When monitoring 
reveals a failure to follow recommended precautions, counseling, education, 
and/or re-training should be provided, and, if necessary, appropriate discipli-
nary action should be considered. 
Professional associations and labor organizations, through continuing education 
efforts, should emphasize the need for health-care workers to follow recommended 
precautions. 
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Serologic Testing for HIV Infection 
Background 
A person is identified as infected with HIV when a sequence of tests, starting with 
repeated enzyme immun.oassays (EIA) and including a Western blot or similar, more 
specific assay, are repeatedly reactive. Persons infected ~ith HIV usually develop 
antibody -against the virus within 6-12 weeks after infection. 
The sensitivity of. the currently licensed EIA tests is at least 99% when they are 
performed under optimal laboratory conditions on serum specimens from persons 
infected for ~12 weeks. Optimal laboratory conditions include the use of reliable 
reagents, provision of continuing education of personnel, quality control of proce-
dures, and participation in performance-evaluation programs. Given this perform-
ance, the probability of a false-negative test is remote except during the first several 
weeks after infection, before detectable antibody is present. The proportion of 
infected persons with a false-negative test attributed to absence of antibody in the 
early stages of infection is dependent on both the incidence and prevalence of HIV 
infection in a population (Table 1 ). 
The specificity of the currently licensed EIA tests is approximately 99% when 
repeatedly reactive tests are considered. Repeat testing of initially reactive specimens 
by EIA is required to reduce the likelihood of laboratory error. To increase further the 
specificity of serologic tests, laboratories must use a supplemental test, most often 
the Western blot, to validate repeatedly reactive EIA results. Under optimal laboratory 
conditions, the sensitivity of the Western blot test is comparable to or greater than 
that of a repeatedly reactive EIA, and the Western blot is highly specific when strict 
criteria are used to interpret the test results. The testing sequence of a repeatedly 
reactive EIA and a positive Western blot test is highly predictive of HIV infection, even 
in a population with a low prevalence of infection (Table 2). If the Western blot test 
result is indeterminant, the testing sequence is considered equivocal for HIV infection. 
TABLE 1. Estimated annual number of patients infected with HIV not detected by 
HIV-antibody testing in a hypothetical hospital with 10,000 admissions/year* 
Approximate 
Approximate number of 
Beginning Annual number of HIV -infected 
prevalence of incidence of HIV-infected patients 
HIV infection HIV infection patients not detected 
5.0% 1.0% 550 17-18 
5.0% 0.5% 525 11-12 
1.0% 0.2% 110 3-4 
1.0% 0.1% 105 2-3 
0.1% 0.02% 1 1 0-1 
0.1% 0.01% 1 1 0-1 
*The estimates are based on the following assumptions: 1) the sensitivity of the screening test 
is 99% (i.e., 99% of HIV-infected persons with antibody will be detected); 2) persons infected with 
HIV will not develop detectable antibody (seroconvert) until6 weeks (1 .5 months) after infection; 
3) new infections occur at an equal rate throughout the year; 4) calculations of the number of 
HIV-infected persons in the patient population are based on the mid-year prevalence, which is 
the beginning prevalence pl_us half the annual incidence of infections. 
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When this. occu~,_ the Western blot test should be repeated on the same' serum 
sample, and, if still indetermitiant, the testing· sequence should be repeated on a 
sample collected 3-6 months later. Use of other .. supplemental tests may aid in 
interpreting of re~ults on samples that are persistently indeterminant by Western blot. 
Testing of Patients 
Previous CDC recommendations have emphasized the value of HIV serologic 
testing of patients for: 1) management of parenteral or mucous-membrane exposures 
of health-care workers, 2) patient diagnosis and management, and 3) counseling and 
serologic· testing to prevent and control HIV transmission in the community. In 
addition, more recent recommendations have stated that hospitals, in conjun~ion 
with state and local health departments, should periodically determine the prevalence 
of HIV infection among patients from age groups at highest risk of infection (32 ). 
Adherence to universal blood and body-fluid precautions recommended for the 
dare of all patients will minimize the risk of transmission of HIV and other blood-borne 
pathogens from patients to health-care workers. The utility of routine HIV serologic 
testing of patients as an adjunct to universal precautions is unknown. Results of such 
testing may not be available in emergency or outpatient settings. In addition, some 
recently infected patients will not have detectable antibody to HIV (Table 1 ). 
Personnel in some hospitals have advocated serologic testing of patients in 
settings in which exposure of health-care workers to large amounts of patients' blood 
may be anticipated. Specific patients for whom serologic testing has been advocated 
include those undergoing major operative procedures and those undergoing treat-
ment in critical-care units, especially if they have conditions involving uncontrolled 
bleeding. Decisions regarding the need to establish testing programs for patients 
should be made by physicians or individual institutions. In addition, when deemed 
appropriate, testing of individual patients may be performed on agreement between 
the patient and the physician providing care. 
In addition to the universal precautions recommended for all patients, certain 
additional precautions for the care of HIV-infected patients undergoing major surgical 
operations have been proposed by personnel in some hospitals. For example, 
surgical procedures on an HIV-infected patient might be altered so that hand-to-hand 
passing of sharp instruments would be eliminated; stapling instruments rather than 
TABLE 2. Predictive value of positive HIV-antibody tests in hypothetical populations 
with different prevalences of infection 
Prevalence Predictive value 
of infection of positive test· 
Repeatedly reactive } 0.2% 28.41% enzyme immunoassay (EIA)t 2.0% 80.16% 
20.0% 98.02% 
Repeatedly reactive EIA l 0.2% 99.75% followed by positive ) 2.0% 99.97% Western blot (WB)t 20.0% 99.99% 
*Proportion of persons with positive test results who are actually infected with HIV. 
t Assumes EIA sensitivity of 99.0% and specificity of 99.5%. 
§Assumes WB sensitivity of 99.0% and specificity of 99.9%. 
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hand-suturing. equipment might be used to perform tissue approximation; electro-
cautery devices rather than scalpels might be used as cutting instrumen~; and, even 
though uncomfortable, gowns that totally prevent seepage of blood onto the skin of. 
members of the operative team might be worn. While such modifications might 
further minimize the risk of HIV infection for members of the operative team, some of 
· these techniques could result in prolongation of operative time and could potentially 
have an adverse effect on the patient. 
Testing progra~s, if developed, should include the forlowing principles: 
• Obtaining consent for testing. 
• Informing patients of test results, a·nd providing counseling for seropositive 
patients by properly trained persons. 
• Assuring that confidentiality safeguards are in place to limit knowledge of test 
results to those directly involved in the care of infected patients or as required 
by law. 
• Assuring that identification of infected patients will not result in denial of 
needed care or provision of suboptimal care. 
• Evaluating prospectively 1) the efficacy of the program in reducing the inci-
dence of parenteral, mucous-membrane, or significant cutaneous exposures of 
health-care workers to the blood or other body fluids of HIV-irfected patients 
and 2) the effect of modified procedures on patients. 
Testing of Health-Care Workers 
Although transmission of HIV from infected health-care workers to patients has not 
been reported, transmission during invasive procedures remains a possibility. Trans-
mission of hepatitis 8 virus (HBV)- a blood-borne agent with a considerably greater 
potential for nosocomial spread- from health-care workers to patients has been 
documented. Such transmission has occurred in situations (e.g., oral and gynecologic 
surgery) in which health-care workers, when tested, had very high concentrations of 
HBV in their blood (at least 100 million infectious viru's particJes per milliliter, a 
concentration much higher than occurs with HIV infection), and the health-care 
workers sustained a puncture wound while performing invasive procedures or had 
exudative or weeping lesions or microlacerations that allowed virus to contaminate 
instruments or open wounds of patients (33,34 ). 
The hepatitis 8 experience indicates that only those health-care workers who 
perform certain types of invasive procedures have transmitted HBV to patients. 
Adherence to recommendations in this document will minimize the risk of transmis-
sion of HIV and other blood-borne pathogens from health-care workers to patients 
during invasive procedures. Since transmission of HIV from infected health-care 
workers performing invasive procedures to their patients has not been reported and 
would be expected to occur only very rarely, if at all, the utility of routine testing of 
such health-care workers to prevent transmission of HIV cannot be assessed. If 
consideration is given to developing a serologic testing program for health-care 
workers who perform invasive procedures, the frequency of testing, as well as the 
issues of consent, confidentiality, and consequences of test results-as previously 
outlined for testing programs for patients- must be addressed. 
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Mat:"Dagement of Infected Health-Care Workers 
Health-care workers with impaired immune systems resulting from HIV infection 
or other causes are at increased risk of acquiring or experiencing serious complica .. 
tions of infectious disease. Of particular concern is the risk of severe infection 
following exposure ·to patients with infectious diseases that are -easily transmitted if 
appropriate precautions are not taken (e.g .. , measles, varicella). Any health-care 
worker with an impaired immune system should be counseled about the potential risk 
associated with taking care of patients with any transmissible infection and should 
continue to follow existing recommendations for infection control to minimize risk of 
exposure to other infectious agents ( 7,35 ). Recommendations of the Immunization 
Practices Advisory Committee (ACIP) and institutional policies concerning require-
ments for vaccinating health-care workers wirh live-virus vaccines (e.g., measles, 
rubella) should also be considered. 
The question of whether \.torkers infected with HIV ~especially those who perform 
invasive procedures-can adequately and safely be allowed to perform patient-care 
duties or whether their work assignments should be changed must be determined on 
an individual basis. These decisions should be made by the health-care worker's 
personal physician(s) in conjunction with the medical directors and personnel health 
service staff of the employing institution or hospital. 
Management of Exposures 
If a health-care worker has a parenteral (e.g., needlestick or cut) or mucous-
membrane (e.g., splash to the eye or mouth) exposure to blood or other body fluids 
or has a cutaneous exposure involving large amounts of blood or prolonged contact 
with blood- especially when the exposed skin is chapped, abraded, or afflicted with 
dermatitis -the source patient should be informed of the incident and tested for 
serologic evidence of HIV infection after consent is obtained. Policies should be 
developed for testing source patients in situ ~ions in which consent cannot be 
obtained (e.g., an unconscious patient). 
If the source patient has AIDS, is positive for HIV antibody, or refuses the test, the 
hea!th-care worker should be counseled regarding the risk of infection and evaluated 
clinically and serologically for evidence of HIV infection as soon as possible after the 
exposure. The health-care worker should be advised to report and seek medical 
evaluation for any acute febrile illness that occurs within 12 vveeks after the exposure. 
Such an illness- particularly one characterized by fever, rash, or lymphadenopathy-
may be indicative of recent HIV infection. Seronegative health-care workers should be 
retested 6 weeks post-exposure and on a periodic basis thereafter (e.g., 12 weeks and 
6 months after exposure) to determine whether transmission has occurred. During 
this follow-up period- especially the first 6-12 weeks after exposure, when most 
infected persons are expected to seroconvert-exposed health-care workers should 
follow U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) recommendations for preventing transmis-
sion of HIV (36,37 ). 
No further follow-up of a health-care worker exposed to infection as described 
above is necessary if the source patient is seronegative unless the source patient is at 
high risk of HIV infection. In the latter case, a subsequent specimen (e.g., 12 weeks 
following exposure) may be obtained from the health-care worker for antibody 
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testing. If the source patient cannot be identified, decisions regarding appropriate 
follow-up should be individualized. Serologic testing should be availahle to all 
health-care workers who are concerned that they may have been infected with HIV. 
If a patient has a parenteral or mucous-membrane exposure to blood or other body 
fluid of a health-care worker, the patient s~ould be informed of the incident, and the 
same procedure outlined above for management of exposures should be followed for 
both the source health-care worker and the exposed patient. 
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APPENDIX C 
Evaluation of Employer Training and Education Programs 
Training programs must be evaluated through program review 
and discussion with management and employees. 
1. Training programs shall normally include epidemiology, 
clinical presentation, modes of transmission and 
prevention of HBV and HIV as well as protective measures 
to be taken to prevent exposure. 
2. The following questions provide a general outline of 
training topics to be reviewed when conducting an 
inspection at a health care facility. Responses shall 
be documented in the case file. Areas of interest 
include, but are not limited to, direct patient care 
areas, emergency room, operating rooms, clinical 
laboratories, x-ray, housekeeping and laundry. 
a. Has a training and information program been 
established for employees actually or potentially 
exposed to blood and/or body fluids? 
b. How often is training provided and does it cover: 
(1) Universal precautions? 
(2) Personal protective equipment? 
(3) Workplace practices including blood drawing, 
room cleaning, laundry handling, cleanup of 
blood spills? 
(4) Needlestick exposure/management? 
(5) Hepatitis B Vaccination? 
c. Does new employee orientation cover infectious disease 
control? 
d. Does the employer evaluate the effectiveness of the 
training program through monitoring of employee 
compliance with the guidelines? 
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e. Have employees been informed of the precautionary 
measures outlined in the CDC guidelines? 
f. Is personal protective equipment provided to employees? 
In all appropriate locations? (Specifically, ask 
about gloves, masks, eye protection, gowns (as 
appropriate) .. ) 
g. Is the necessary equipment (i.e., mouthpieces, 
resuscitation bags, or other ventilation devices) 
provided for administering mouth-to- mouth 
resuscitation on potentially infected patients? 
h. Does training identify tho specific procedures 
implemented by the employer to provide protection, 
such as proper use of personal protective equipment? 
i. Are facilities available to comply with workplace 
practices, such as handwashing sinks, needle 
containers, detergents and disinfectants to clean up 
spills? 
j. Are employees aware of specific workplace practices to 
follow when appropriate? Specifically ask about: 
o Handwashing .. 
o Handling sharp instruments. 
o Routine examinations. 
o Blood spills. 
o Handling of laundry. 
o Disposal of contaminated materials. 
o Reusable equipment. 
k. Are workers aware of procedures to follow after a 
needlestick or blood exposure? Have they had such 
experiences, and are the guidelines followed? 
1. Are employees aware of the Hepatitis B vaccination 
program? Do they take advantage of it? 
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